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PLANETARY QUARANTINE IMPACTS ON PROBE DESIGN
Robert E. DeFrees _ "_ N75 204 07
McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company
MR. DEFREES: The switch in order was especially advantageous
because a lot of the things that I had to presume have already been
explained by Alan Hoffman. The planetary quarantine program, as
far as probes are concerned, progressed in the following fashion.
We designed a probe under contract to Ames for entry into Saturn
and Uranus. We were asked at the start of the design to hold off
any provisions for planetary quarantine, specifically. Subsequent-
ly, after completing the basic contract, we were given a contract
to determine the incremental effects of imposing planetary quaran-
tine on the probe design that we had evolved. Quite frankly, the
changes are small in scope and few in number. The business of
planetary quarantine begins with a probability analysis. An anal-
ogy I would like to draw is: Walt Disney usually referred to his
work as an examination of plausible improbabilities. The planetary
quarantine business is the inverse of that, in that it is the ex-
amination of plausible probabilities. We are constantly setting
standards and, as engineers, trying to live with them. The stand-
ards that are set here are on Figure 9-6, the probability of con-
tamination and the probability of growth.
NASA Headquarters, in particular the planetary Quarantine
Officer, sets these probabilities. They have been set for each of
the planets and for some of the missions. In general, the proba-
bility of contamination value is the same for these planets, in-
cluding all four of the giant planets. Pluto is still expected -
as is Mercury - as being of little biological interest. In effect,
the probability of growth is the more significant number because
a probe is intended to go into the planet; and if it does, it has
a chance of releasing organisms which can grow. Therefore, this
number is divided up according to the number of missions, number
of times you expect something to have the potential for contam-
inating that planet, and the transit survival potential. A flyby
can contaminate it in one of two ways, (i) by direct entry or (2)
by ejecta from part of the entire launch vehicle or spacecraft. Also,
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Figure 9-6 Probability of Contamination and Growth
PLANET PROBABILITIES GROWTH,p(g)(2)
CONTAMINATION, P(c)(1)
VENUS I x10-3 Ix 10-9 (ATM)
NIL (SURFACE)
MARS I x10-3 Ix 10-6
JOVIAN PLANETS 1 xl0 -3 I x i0-6
MISSIONS
1975VIKING 7.2 x 10-5
ORBITER AND LANDER)
=IONEERF AND G(EACH)
PIONEER G (SATURN)
OUTER PLANET MISSIONS
(PER FLIGHT, PER PLANET)
SATURNAND URANUS(3)
6.4 x 10-5
1 x 10-4
7.1 x 10-5
2.5 x 10-5
ixi0-4
Ix10-4
Ix10-4
ixi0-6
(SUAEP STUDY)
I)STAVRO AND GONZALEZ, PLANETARY QUARANTINE CONSIDERATIONS FOR OUTER PLANET MISSIONS.
2)PLANETARY QUARANTINE SPECIFICATIONSHEETS,FOR NASA BY EXOTECH SYSTEMS,INC.,ISSUED121"/3
3)STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE ON THE DESIGNOF AN OUTER PLANETS ATMOSPHERIC
PROBE, MDC EI053,29MARCH 1974;INTENTIONALLY MORE CONSERVATIVE.
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the other factor involved is time. In the case of Mars mission,
there is a fifty-year time period of reasonable non-contamination
involved. In general, for the outer planets, the ti..me span is set
at about twenty years and then one has to determine how many
times American, U.S.S.R., or some other country is going to send
something to the vicinity of the planets. From this you get the
probability of contamination and, also, fairly arbitrarily, you
establish the growth probability for each of those planets.
Now, Pioneer ii, originally Pioneer G, is interesting in that
it will go past Jupiter, having the potential for contaminating it,
and then go on to Saturn. The analyses for both of the flights,
F&G, were performed some time ago (before launch) by Ames Research
Center and then the Pioneer G was extended to the Saturn case (be-
fore Jupiter encounter). This was of interest to us on the Saturn-
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Uranus probe study, because our Saturn-Uranus probe has a similar
mode of operation: a flyby of one planet and a deposition of a probe
into the second. In general, as you can see, the value for the pro-
bability of contamination at the second planet is given a little
relief (lowered) from that of the first.
We have chosen a deliberately more severe requirement than have
some other authors simply because the number of flights is not well
established yet, ove:_ "this twenty-year time period, and we felt it
was appropriate to establish the more stringent requirement on our
own studies.
The classic requirement for sterilization has been established
in the Viking program and you will hear a good deal more discussion
about that in a few minutes from Bob Howell. But, classically, it
is a matter of saying that if you heat something at a temperature
above a hundred degrees Centigrade,you will enhance the probability
of decreasing the microbe load; and, in fact, plotted on a semi-
log paper it is a straight line. In effect, if you hold a certain
temperature for a period of time, you will decrease the number of
microbes on that object from 100% to 10% to one percent to one
tenth of one percent, and so forth. This is usually referred to as
decimal reduction time (D-value) and it is also sometimes referred
to as decades or logs. (See Figure 9-7)
The standard D-value that is used is that for bacillus sub-
tilus variant niger, as supplied by the U.S. Public Health Service.
The temperature that was initially set for Viking was 125°C. This
was later changed to I13°C. On the outer planet probes, we now un-
derstand it may go back to 125 ° because there tends to be more probe
equipment available that has been tested at the higher temperatures.
This has to be a consideration in the costing. It conceivably could
be a requirement for more testing of a probe, even though there is a
tremendous fund of knowledge already available in the Viking program.
In addition to that, the life of a planetary quarantine engineer
is a little bit complicated by the discovery that not all microbes
are willing to die at the same rate that bacillus subtilus does.
This leads to a problem wherein some will follow a more-or-less
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Figure 9-8. Estimated Thermal Response Characteristics
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normal decay rate, whereas, others have a very prolonged decay
rate. An example is on Figure 9-7. It is not the only example,
others have even shallower slopes. In this example, the times
were chosen fairly arbitrarily and the ratio between the two
types was shown. The net effect of this is that instead of
periods of the order of forty or fifty hours of terminal steril-
ization, we might be forced to go to longer periods to guarantee
that these hardy ones are killed off. The obvious requirement
on the part of cleanliness engineers and their staffs is to find
out whether that type of microbe is prevalent in clean rooms. It
is analogous to the problem in surgical situations after World
War II where they suddenly found tremendous quantities of staphy-
lococcus showing up in operating rooms: a rather horrible con-
cept that they had to lick rather quickly due to excessive de-
pendence on antibiotics and relaxed cleanliness procedures.
The requirements for heat sterilization are shown on Figure
9-8 as they affect the equipment designer, the man who provides
the oven, and also the design engineer, who is designing the
probe. If you make a probe to go through space where there is
very little sunlight, it is going to get cold. So, in general,
we have provided a rather effective barrier to reduce the rate
of loss of heat in space. The net effect of this as far as an
oven is concerned is that you can turn the oven on and run it
up to 113 ° Celsius in a matter of hours. Some of the components
will heat up rather rapidly. This is shown as exceeding the
oven line. Obviously, it wouldn't exceed the oven unless it
is something like the radio isotope heater unit inside which
would go beyond the oven temperature and will get to that tem-
perature rather quickly.
Other components in the case of the probe, the battery is
a good example, are buried inside of multiple-layer insulation
and inside some foam insulation on one side or some powder in-
sulation on the other. It may also have deliberately poor heat
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conductive paths to the framework. The net effect is that some
component is going to take a long while to get up to this temper-
ature. But, if you determine this fact by analysis and confirm
it later by tests, that this particular component only go to I13°C
at the time you shut off the oven, you still can expect some re-
duction in microbes by the fact that it exceeded I00 °, more par-
ticularly 110 ° , before the oven was turned off. But the problem
_ far as the probe designer is concerned is how long will it be
subjected to that temperature and how frequently. Again, this
goes back to the fact that most units are designed to the quali-
fication test requirements and not to the true environment; thus,
you have to determine the total length of time this temperature
exposure is held if you wish to calculate microbe kill capability.
The classic equation was inferred by A1 Hoffman when he
showed that the probability of contamination is a function of the
number that is present at the start of the terminal sterilization
period, divided by the probabilities for survival, for release,
and for growth. This determines the number of microbes that will
remain when the probe enters the planet.
Now in a forty-hour period we can decrease the number of
microbes from, say, three and a half, typically, to ten logs.
This is in effect even if you start with a million microbes on-
board, you cut them to 105, 104, 103, 102, i0 I, and even below;
to get a probability less than one that there are any living
microbes.
A further reason for doing this is that we are looking for
the flight acceptance test requirements, trying to set them for
the components and for the probe itself. This branched system,
Figure 9-9, shows components on the upper branch and the assembled
probe with a presumed bioshield and test requirements requiring
from fifty-four hours of exposure at II0 ° to i13°C. In a dis-
cussion yesterday with Bob Howell and Leo Daspit of Langley, the
acceptance test temperature for components is usually the upper
limit of 125 ° . What we are after is a determination of how many
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Figure 9-9. Sterilization Development Testing
times will the component be subjected to the worst case terminal
sterilization cycle. This is of interest because one of the side
benefits of going through this type of cycling is that you per-
formed an excellent accelerated life test, because you have
raised the component or probe to a high temperature repeatedly.
That, of course, is deleterious to plastics, to rubbers, and to
other materials whose physical properties are temperature de-
pendent.
A total of eight cycles was negotiated in the Viking pro-
gram. We initially adopted this in our probe studies. We feel
the number is a negotiable item relative to a probe design. A
lower number of cycles are preferred simply because the probe
is orders of magnitude less complex than the Viking lander.
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For internal equipment sterilizations, we have to determine
a time. This is performed at ii0 _ to 113 ° on Viking. It may go
back up to 125°C on the probes, according to Larry Hall, and if
so, that fact will have to be taken into account both in writing
of procedures and in the costing of the probe.
The net result of all this is that there are changes that
were required in probe configuration. The accompanying figure,
Figure 9-10 lists them. The significant ones are that a bio _
shield is necessary or some other form of prevention of con-
t amination after the unit is ) assembled. There may be changes in
the adapter. Inside the probe, the chief changes are in thermal
control (a Substitution of one plastic for another); the electrical
• STRUCTURAL MECHANICAL - BIOSHIELD (iNNEW ADAPTER)
- FIELD JOINT (INNEW ADAPTER)
- DESIGN FOR 1 ATM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
- SEPARATIONOF BIOSHIELDCOVERAT EARTH
- HONEYCOMB THAT IS SELF-VENTING tN CHANGING PRESSURES
• THERMALCONTROL - KAPTONSUBSTITUTEDFOR MYLAR INSULATIONBLANKET
- SlLVERIZE RATHER THAN GOLDIZE THE EXTERNAL MLI
• ELECTRONICS - EQUIPMENTLIMITS ARE 160°F (OPERATING)
- SOMEWEIGHTAND COSTPENALTIES
• ELECTRICAL - MAIN BATTERY UP 33%IN WEIGHT
r__ MAIN BATTERY UP 28% IN VOLUME
-- CELL CASES MUST USE HI'TEMP PLASTICS
-- NEW SEPARATORS REQUIRED
-- PLATE POROSITY CHANGES IN NiCd BATTERIES
-- SUBSTITUTION OF KAPTON OR TEFLON INSULATION ON WIRES
- CLAMPSCUSHIONEDBY TEFLON
• SPACECRAFT - CABLE CUTTER MOVED INSIDEBIOSHIELD
- CHANGESIN WEIGHT:SEQUENCINGEQUIPMENT ,
• MASS PROPERTIES - 16.5 LB INCREASE, MOSTLY IN BIOSHIELD AND POWER SUBSYSTEM
Figure 9-10. Design Impact Summary
system, (the batteries tend to get bigger, which means heavier);
and very little change for the electronics. The chief reason
for the increased battery weight is that silver peroxide will
break down to silver oxide at the temperatures involved, so you
can't count on that particular fifty-percent plateau of energy.
Thus, the size of the plates just about double. There are some
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other changes in the spacecraft, which are not too significant.
The result is an increase in the case of a Pioneer-attached probe
of about sixteen and a half pounds. In a Mariner installation
this could be a little bit heavier because we have built the bio-
shield into the adapter and taken advantage of that structural
unit. So on Mariner the increment would be about eighteen and
a half pounds.
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There are some cost increments involved. The cost esti-
mates that were made were based on contractor-furnished science
instruments and, also, they pertain only to the direct costs of
planetary quarantine related to the cost of the probe itself, and
not to the Overall program costs which would include spacecraft,
launch and NASA mission operations costs. The analyses showed
that most of the increase is in the design analysis and in the
test phases. The basic probe cost is $40 million and the cost in-
crement equals $13 million. This incremental increase is about
twenty-one percent of direct contracted probe costs (about 5-6%
of all costs).
In conclusion, there are really only two overriding conclu-
sions, although I have included a list of some general and speci-
fic ones on Figure 9-11. The overriding ones are: (i) that a probe
can be built in a sterile condition with no insurmountable prob-
lems to the design engineer, and (2) that the cost increments are
predictable, which usually means that they are controllable. It
is usually only unpredictable ones that are uncontrollable.
MR. TOMS: Our third speaker will be Bob Howell from Martin
who has been working on the Viking Program and will show us just
how the implementation problems have been solved for Viking.
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PLANETARY QUARANTINEREQUIREMENTSDO NOTAFFECT TIME NEEDEDTO DEVELOP
THE PROBE;BUT DO INCREASEMANUFACTURINGSTEPSAND HANDLINGDIFFICULTY
• COSTSWILL INCREASEABOUT21,%DUE TO MINIMIZINGCONTAMINATIONAT EVERY STAGE
OF FABRICATIONAND PRE-LAUNCHOPERATIONS
DRY HEAT STERILIZATIONWITHINA BIOSHiELDISCOMPATIBLE _ITHPLANETARY
QUARANTINE OBJECTIVES AND WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF TECHNOLOGY.
STUDIESOF OTHER TECHNIQUES ARE UNDERWAY FOR ATMOSPHERIC PROBE
MANUFACTURE TO LOWER THE INCREMENTAL COSTS FURTHER.
• THE PROBE COULD BE ASSEMBLED INa LARGE L_,N_NARFLOW BENCH FaCILItYAND,
THEREBY, LIMITMICROBE GROV;TH,A CLASS 100ROOM, IFAVAILABLE, FACILITATES
ACCESS.
• RETAINED (AFT)PART OF BIOSHIELDCAN BE INTEGRATED INTO A NEW SPACECRAFT-
TE3_4-4ADAPTER; FORV_ARDCOVER CAN BE RELEASED ALONG _ITH THE JETTISONED
TE364-4STAGE AFTER ITINJECTSTHE SPACECRAFT AND PROSE INTO A TRANSIT ORBIT.
•PROBE COLLAPSE ISNOT IMMINENTAT PRESSURES UP TO 30ATM; ELECTRICAL EQUIP-
MENT ISDESIGNED FOR OPERATION INA IBDOFAMBIENT TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT.
FAILURES WILL OCCUR PROGRESSIVELY AS THE FORWARD COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE
EXCEEDS THISVALUE.
Figure 9-11. Summary of Conclusions
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